We analyse the optimal antitrust enforcement against collusion under asymmetric information with a continuum of types. We focus on prudential deterrence, by imposing that expected nes cannot induce losses even o the equilibrium path. Due to incentive compatibility, e cient cartels enjoy positive rents even when prosecution is costless, created through reduced nes and price cost margins. In equilibrium this distortion is lower for more e cient t ypes, while full collusion can be tolerated for high cost cartels. Moreover, regulation with positive transfers is better than antitrust enforcement, which h o wever allows to implement more e cient outcomes than price caps.
Introduction
Competition policy is today one of the building blocks of supply side public intervention in the economy in all the industrialized countries. It tends to gain a major role, and eventually to replace the more traditional and discretionary tools of industrial policy based of transfers and subsidies to speci c industries or rms. Moreover, it is often the natural candidate to promote public intervention in industries that were previously monopolized and regulated.
It seems therefore important to understand how the normative analysis of optimal antitrust enforcement can be developed. The main reference is the literature on the optimal enforcement o f l a w which originated from the seminal paper by Becker 1968 . Recent developments in this eld formalize optimal enforcement a s a m e c hanism design problem 1 in which the public authority uses nes and the probability o f i n tervention to implement, through the expected penalty s c hedule, second best optimal actions given the incentive constraints that arise from asymmetric information.
This analytical framework can be applied quite naturally to the problem of optimal enforcement of competition policy. Although the analysis is normative in nature, the description of the set of instruments and constraints that identify antitrust is usually positive, i.e. it draws from the main features of competition policy as observed in practice. For instance, competition policy is associated to the nes that can be imposed if rms are proved to be guilty, with no power to prescribe explicitly the price or any other speci c legal conduct. In other words, the key questions addressed are how to use nes, the probability o f i n tervention etc. in an optimal way, while it is left aside, for example, why the authority should be restricted to use only negative transfers to rms and not positive ones.
If the antitrust authority had full information on rms' types, no cost of prosecution and unbounded nes, the rst best would be attainable: a ne su ciently high to prevent a n y t ype from collusion would induce rms to prefer legal non cooperative behaviour. Antitrust enforcement becomes interesting because in real situations the authority has informational constraints, limited resources and bounded penalties. The optimal allocations implemented depend, in turn, on the particular features of these three sets of constraints.
The more relevant reference in the eld is so far the paper by Besanko and Spulberg 1989, where the authors analyse the optimal design of antitrust intervention under asymmetric information when there are two t ypes of cartels costs. The enforcer commits to a set of instruments, i.e. nes and probability o f i n tervention, which make the expected penalties contingent on some observed signal, as for instance the market price. They nd that in a separating equilibrium the e cient cartel colludes and is not prosecuted, while the high cost cartel is induced to competitive Bertrand behaviour and is monitored with positive probability. The Besanko and Spulberg setting is generalized in Penard and Souam 1996 to the case of a continuum of types. The optimal allocations implementable maintain the same qualitative features of the original paper: the e cient t ypes collude while the less e cient ones are induced to choose non cooperative behaviour through su ciently high nes that would imply negative p a yo if collusion occurred. Considering the three sets of constraints which usually characterize the enforcement problem, in the Besanko and Spulberg setting the use of suciently high nes enables the enforcer to circumvent the asymmetric information problem, provided that the costs of enforcement is negligible: since ex-post monitoring allows to ascertain if illegal behaviour occurred, high nes would induce rms not to collude at all; if prosecution were not costly, any t ype would be monitored in equilibrium and would prefer to behave non-cooperatively. In turn, the features of optimal enforcement depend on the constraint of costly enforcement.
In this paper we try to explore the antitrust enforcement problem considering an additional feature that often characterizes competition policy: since rms can implement price cost margins through legal but unobserved non cooperative behaviour as well as through collusion, and since the monitoring technology hardly excludes that an innocent rm might be condemned, there is always the possibility that a rm has to pay an unexpected ne. If we w ant to exclude that competition policy forces the exit of rms, we have to set some restrictions on the use of nes. Relying on this general motivation, in our model we assume that the expected penalties cannot be higher than gross pro ts, i.e. that the participation constraint holds, even o the equilibrium path. We call this restriction prudential deterrence, a s opposed to the approach in the Besanko and Spulberg setting.
We nd that the price schedule implementable is increasing, while the net pro ts are decreasing in cartel's costs. Consequently, e cient cartels have positive informational rents according to the incentive compatible mechanisms. Moreover, the expected penalty s c hedule must be increasing if a price lower than the monopoly level is implemented. Since the most favourable penalty can be at most zero, the rents for e cient t ypes must be created through price cost margins. However, with prudential enforcement w e cannot prevent ine cient t ypes from partially collude, as in the Besanko and Spulberg setting. The optimal price schedule, in fact, entails prices higher than costs for all the types, with larger allocative distortions for less e cient types, which can eventually implement full collusion and pay in expected terms the associated maximum penalty.
Once characterized the optimal allocations implementable through prudential enforcement, it is interesting to compare them with those that would occur if the industry were regulated. Antitrust and regulation are in fact often alternative candidates to promote public intervention in very concentrated markets. For instance, the privatization of public utilities is today considered rstly as a problem of industry reform 2 , and the distinction of the vertical segments which are natural monopoly from those where competition can be promoted has led in many cases to create a much more articulated industry structure. Antitrust is then in many submarkets an alternative to regulation, and a comparison of the two s c hemes of intervention seems necessary.
The modern theory of regulation 3 analyses the choice of optimal regulatory schemes as a mechanism design problem under asymmetric information. The analytical framework of the two approaches to public intervention is therefore the same, resulting in a quite natural comparison. We nd that regulation with transfers dominates antitrust prudential enforcement, which h o wever allows to implement more e cient allocations with respect to regulation without transfers price caps.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of antitrust intervention, while the optimal enforcement mechanism is discussed in section 3. In section 4 we compare the allocations implementable with di erent regulatory regimes and those with antitrust enforcement. Some comments on further research in the eld conclude the paper.
A model of antitrust intervention
Optimal deterrence of price xing agreements will be the object of our analysis. Since in a cartel a group of rms act coordinately and promote an agreed and illegal strategy, those rms will be treated as a single entity, the cartel, which is the party prosecuted by the enforcer.
Firms o er identical products and industry demand is described by a The enforcer does not observe the realization of the marginal cost c but knows the distribution gc and the demand function Dp, and ex-post observes the price p. More precisely, w e assume that rms' costs are not observable either ex-ante or ex-post, through auditing. What the enforcer can eventually nd when prosecuting a cartel is evidence of collusion, as for instance minutes of meetings, internal regulations that prescribe rules of reciprocal disclosure of information, etc. 4 .
The enforcement mechanism is described by a pair of functions sp 2 0; s and fp 2 0; 1 which represent respectively the ne and the probability of being ned 5 . The expected penalty associated to a price p is therefore 4 We feel this assumption is quite close to actual antitrust enforcement, where proving collusion through an estimate of costs and monopoly price is usually not the case, while evidence of concerted practices is often the key argument for condemning. 5 This latter can be related to di erent contingencies, as the probability of being discovered, the probability of being prosecuted and the probability of being found guilty. W e esp = fp sp 2 0; s . The costs of the enforcement policy are linear in the probability o f i n tervention, i.e. C e = k fp. We assume that the enforcer is able to commit ex ante to his enforcement policy.
The net pro ts of the cartel given the enforcement mechanism are c p = u c p , esp 3 All parties are assumed to be risk neutral. The enforcer is assumed to be benevolent and maximizes the sum of the surplus of the parties less the enforcement costs EWp = Z c c CSp + esp + c p , kfp gcdc real cases it is always possible that an innocent rm is condemned. Hence, antitrust enforcement m ust be prudential, avoiding losses even o the equilibrium path.
Solving the problem as described above is rather cumbersome. Hence, we proceed according to Baron and Myerson 1982 by rst identifying the implementable allocations that satisfy the two sets of constraints, and then by maximising the welfare function given the implementable allocations.
Implementable allocations
In this section we analyse the restrictions implied by the incentive compatibility and participation constraints of the original problem that can help to make it simpler. We restrict ourselves to implementing a piecewise continuous price schedule 6 A rst step is proved in the following lemma, using a revealed preferences argument. Hence, an implementable price schedule cannot induce a lower price for a less e cient rm. The next step allows to characterize the net pro ts of a type c rm according to the incentive compatible price schedule. Let 6 In the optimal control problem that will be explicitly considered when solving for the optimal mechanism, this restriction amounts to the standard assumption that the control -the implementable price -is piecewise continuous. du c p c dp , desp c dp dp c dc = ,Dp c 7 since the term in brackets is null due to the envelope theorem.
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If the enforcer were informed about the cartel costs c, enforcement w ere costless and nes unbounded, the optimal solution would be to induce through a su ciently high sanction each rm to set p = c, the rst best solution, and rms of any t ype would obtain no pro t. In an asymmetric information, costly prosecution and bounded nes environment, the more e cient rms gain positive pro ts, which are to be interpreted as rents from their informational advantage.
Using the results in Lemma 1 and 2, we can further characterize the incentive compatible expected penalty. We can summarize the features of the implementable allocations in the following way. The enforcer has to prevent the cartel from setting a high monopoly price through expected penalties. The incentive compatible price schedule on which the policy is built must be non decreasing in costs, allowing less e cient rms to recover higher costs through higher prices. In order to prevent a general upward movement of prices, however, expected penalties must be su ciently increasing in price to prevent a more e cient cartel from setting its monopoly price by mimicking a higher cost one. The overall e ect is a fall in net pro ts as costs increase. More e cient cartels enjoy a positive rent due to their informational advantage, while less ecient ones might break even. We can now m o ve to the analysis of optimal allocations among the implementable ones.
Optimal enforcement
Let's consider rst expected penalties for the most e cient t ype. We h a ve shown that, if deterrence occurs for some prices costs, it requires an expected penalty s c hedule increasing in the observed price. De ne p c p m c as the lowest price implementable. A corollary of Lemma 3 is that, since no deterrence is needed for prices lower than p c , being the gross pro ts u c p increasing in that region, the expected penalty can be at for p p c .
What is needed to ensure marginal deterrence is that the expected penalty is increasing to the right a t p c .
Since expected penalties are costly in terms of welfare, it is optimal to set esp = 0 for p p c , with eventually 7 a kink at p c . Using this fact we can further characterize the expected penalities. the highest type cartel breaking even; moreover, the informational rents of the most e cient cartel are minimized by implementing the lowest price schedule. If the maximum penalty i s l o wer than the gross monopoly pro ts of the least e cient cartel, even this latter will have some rents and the implementable price schedules will be higher.
Let's now consider the selection of the implementable allocation which maximizes welfare given the participation and incentive compatibility constraints and the boundary conditions on the expected penalties. This can be framed as an optimal control problem in which the state variable is the net pro t c p c and the control variable is the price p c 2 c; p m c . We h a ve seen that the set of participation constraints can be replaced by the condition 12, which means that we h a ve a boundary condition on the state variable at the top. Incentive compatibility requires that 7, which is the state equation in our problem, holds. Moreover, it is well known from the literature on regulation 8 that, when the cost function is linear in output, the condition that the price schedule is nondecreasing in c is su cient for incentive compatibility. Finally, w e h a ve to add the two constraints that the maximum expected penalty is not greater than the maximum penalty allowed and that the minimum expected penalty is non negative. The rst constraint is already encompassed by the participation constraint 12, while the requirement of non negative penalties will bind for the most e cient cartel, being the expected penalty increasing in the observed price. The problem for the enforcer is therefore We initially consider the optimal enforcement when prosecution is costless, i.e. k = 0, or alternatively, when the cost of enforcement is xed. This preliminary result will make it clear that the cost of enforcement is only a part of the problem, and that even when prosecution can be increased costlessly within the participation constraint, asymmetric information plays a major role in the solution. Substituting in 14 and solving we obtain the expression of the price schedule, with c adjusting for the price to be not greater than the monopoly price; notice that the price schedule is nondecreasing in c, as required by incentive compatibility. Moreover, substituting the equilibrium price in the participation constraint for the highest cost type and in the non negative penalties constraint for the lowest cost type, it is easy to check that both are strictly binding. Finally, 14 for the lowest type would contain also the term du c =dp c 0, which w ould imply a di erent expression and a higher level of the welfare maximizing price, breaking the monotonicity constraint at the bottom. However, we are free to assign any v alue to the control at the points of discontinuity 9 without a ecting the value of the Hamiltonian, being the distribution of c non atomic. Hence, we simply apply the expression above of the optimal price also to the lowest type.
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The result obtained requires some comments. We h a ve seen that incentive compatibility requires to create rents for the more e cient t ypes. If positive transfers are not allowed, as is the case when we can use only nes, informational rents must be created through price cost margins. Notice that the price schedule adds to the marginal cost c the mark-up =gc: if the density distribution gc is not increasing too much, it means that the allocative distortion is larger for less e cient t ypes. For instance, with a uniform distribution of types, the additive mark-up is the same for all cartels, and therefore the price schedule is less distortionary for more e cient cartels. This is the outcome of two con icting forces at work: on the one hand the traditional "no distortion at the top at the bottom, in our case" principle; on the other hand the need to create su cient incentives rents for e cient types to induce them to price below their monopoly price. When positive transfers are not allowed, it is not possible to separate the incentive and the allocative problem, reaching the rst best. In our constrained problem of antitrust enforcement w e cannot separate the two tasks, and therefore we are able to implement only a second best outcome.
Moreover, it must be noticed that transfering nes to consumers plays an important role in the welfare maximization problem: we allow less efcient rms to set prices closer to their monopoly level, but we ne them increasingly transferring the penalty to the consumers with no additional distortion. In some cases it is too optimistic to assume that this transfer can be implemented without distortion: for instance, we might not be able to identify the consumers which are active in the market involved, or there might be additional costs for the rm, as lost reputation, with no associated transfer to the consumers. But the simpler case in which nes are not pure transfers is when the enforcement is costly.
Hence, we n o w consider the optimal enforcement policy with costly prosecution, maintaining the assumption of maximum penalties su ciently high. The result above can be easily proved on the same line of argument o f the previous proposition. Consider the di erent terms of the expression. The rst two terms correspond to the gross welfare variation when the price is increased, i.e. the variation in consumer surplus and gross pro ts. In the rst best allocation they would balance out. The other terms take i n to account the enforcement problem and constraints: ,D 0 =gc is positive and determines the creation of price cost margins and increasing allocative distortions for less e cient t ypes, as we have seen in the case of costless enforcement. The last term in brackets is related to enforcement costs, which add to the other terms in balancing marginal bene ts and costs in terms of welfare 11 . Since this negative term 10 We assume k=s to be su ciently small to ensure that the second order conditions hold.
11
This term can be rewritten as @uc=@pgc ,GcD 0
. If the enforcer allows typeĉ to set a higher price, he has to raise the prosecution rate applied to typeĉ by duĉ=dp in order to deter higher types from switching to that higher price. Since the frequency of typeĉ is gĉ, this explains the rst term. On the other hand, if pĉ is higher, it becomes realively in absolute terms becomes larger, through Gc, as c increases, the incentive to increase price over costs is reduced for less e cient t ypes, balancing the previous e ect of an almost xed additive mark up . This conclusion is in line with our intuition: if penalties are distortionary, allowing high prices for ine cient t ypes and using nes to transfer welfare to consumers is ine cient, and we prefer to limit the increase in price cost margins for less e cient t ypes.
Antitrust vs regulation
We pointed out that often the design of supply side policy intervention has to choose between competition policy and regulation. The framework we h a ve developed to analyse antitrust enforcement allows quite naturally to compare the outcomes implementable through competition policy with those obtainable through regulation. This latter encompasses obviously a very broad set of policies, which di er in terms of instruments and market structure; hence we do not pretend to perform a complete analysis of the issue. However, it seems interesting to compare, in terms of welfare, optimal antitrust enforcement with two regulatory regimes: when the regulator can use transfers to rms and when transfers are banned. More precisely, consider the following policy regimes, all characterized by asymmetric information of the public authority on the costs of the rms. model of regulation of a monopolist with unknown costs and RNT is the case in which the regulator cannot use transfers to the regulated rm. The following proposition establishes the ranking in terms of welfare among the three regimes.
Proposition 6 EW RT E W AE E W RNT Proof: We'll show that the three regimes can be expressed as di erent versions of the same mechanism design problem we analysed in the previous sections. The key point is the equivalence between direct mechanisms, those usually considered in the regulatory problem, and indirect mechanisms we used in the enforcement problem. Moreover, the assumption of perfectly correlated costs within the cartel makes the monopoly and oligopoly industrial structures perfectly comparable.
Compare rst AE and RT. If we do not impose the constraint of non negative penalties in the enforcement problem analysed in proposition 4, Compare now AE and RNT. In this latter case the regulator has no way to create rents through transfers, and therefore we expect allocative distorsions. Moreover, the participation constraint implies that no price below c can be imposed, since costs are unknown. Hence, the menu of contracts as a function of the reported costĉ is pĉ = p m c forĉ 2 c;c and pĉ = c forĉ 2 c; c , wherec is such that p m c = c. This mechanism clearly induces truthtelling revelation and solves incentive compatibility. The participation constraint will bind for the less e cient t ype. This mechanism is equivalent, in terms of outcomes, to the following expected penalty s c hedule for an AE problem: esp c = 0 f o r p c c and esp c = s for p c c. This penalty s c hedule, given that s u c p c will induce bunching at c for all the cartels less e cient thatc. Since the RNT problem can be entirely formulated as an AE problem with no further constraint, and its allocation does not correspond to the AE outcome, RNT must be inferior with respect to AE.
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Proposition 6 shows that competition policy is inferior with respect to regulation when this latter can use transfers: in this case, in fact the regulator is able to completely separate the incentive and the allocative problem reaching the rst best. However the antitrust approach seems preferable when regulation cannot use transfers, as in a price cap regime: negative transfers -penalties -allow in fact to use more powerful mechanisms and to implement more e cient outcomes. Figure 1 shows the allocations implemented in the three regimes. The RT regime ---line implements the rst best through transfers negative penalties; the AE regime leaves rents through price cost margins at a lower level for e cient t ypes than the RNT regime, in which cartels up to thec type choose their monopoly price.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we h a ve analyzed the optimal prudential enforcement of antitrust law under asymmetric information on cartel's costs. The main features of the optimal policy are:
The policy implements second best allocations with price cost margins for all the cartel types; hence, prices higher than marginal cost are not necessarely prosecuted even if they are indirectly evidence of partial collusion. The price cost margins tend to be lower for more e cient t ypes; The expected penalty is increasing in observed price; E cient cartels obtain informational rents while the least e cient cartel eventually breaks even; The antitrust enforcement regime is inferior with respect to a regulatory regime when transfers to rms are allowed, but is preferable to the situation in which regulators cannot use transfers, as in the price cap case.
The key ingredient of our result is the interplay b e t ween asymmetric information and "prudential" enforcement, i.e. the constraint not to induce losses even o the equilibrium path: if cartel types were observable either ex ante or ex post and su ciently severe penalties might be used as a deterrent, rst best allocations would be implementable provided that very high nes were feasible. Under asymmetric information partecipation and incentive compatibility constraints severely limit the set of implementable price schedules, and positive rents must be created for more e cient t ypes in order to prevent them from setting higher prices.
These results di er from those in Besanko and Spulberg 1989 for the two t ypes case and from Penard and Souam 1996 for a continuoum of types, which all admit severe penalties o the equilibrium path. In those papers the e cient t ypes collude while the ine cients behave noncooperatively.
In this paper we h a ve focussed our analysis on a particular feature that positively identi es antitrust policy and distinguishes it from regulation, i.e. the feasibility of negative transfers to rms. When we compare competition policy with regulation there are other features which seem relevant, and that might be considered in future research.
First of all, regulation tends to de ne the menu of contracts ex ante, while typically antitrust is in most cases an ex post intervention: we b ypassed this problem by assuming that the enforcer is able to commit to a policy, for instance by issuing guidelines and by building a reputation over time 12 . The problem of commitment, however, is not speci c to antitrust, and becomes extremely serious in regulation as well, once this latter is considered in a dynamic setting.
Secondly, competition policy is used in oligopoly situations while regulation is mainly conceived for monopoly: in our setting we do not exploit this structural di erence and the enforcer treats the cartel as a single entity. A n interesting case would be to design prosecution against collusion in order to induce some of the participants to reveal evidence on illegal behaviour, reducing the cost of enforcement.
Thirdly, in a broader political economy perspective, the regulatory capture issue seems quite di erent in the two insitutional settings we are comparing: regulation is strictly tied to the rm regulated in a long run and stable relationship; on the contrary an antitrust authority is competent o ver 12 The no commitment case in antitrust enforcement is for instance considered for the two t ypes case in Martini and Rovesti 1997. a wide range of industries and no sistematic relationship tends to occur. Hence, rms' pressure and lobbying in the initial phase when the policy is designed is much less likely in competition policy. H o wever, if competition policy maintains a certain degree of ex post discretion with respect to regulation, the incentives to bribe ex post might be higher.
